Although numerous theoretical articles investigate factors affecting corporate demand for insurance, empirical tests of the theories are very limited. This article is one of the first attempts to empirically investigate the demand for general insurance of non-financial corporations by using data on Japanese corporations. Regarding insurance demand of Japanese corporations, size, leverage, and regulation are important factors in determining insurance purchases by large Japanese firms, whereas ownership structure and tax consideration are not.
INTRODUCTION
In Japan, as well as in the United States, corporations commonly purchase insurance contracts. For example, in 1994, Japanese non-financial incorporated enterprises as a whole paid ¥1.3 trillion for non-life insurance premiums, which was equivalent to 2.3 percent of their total operating surplus (¥5 trillion).
1 ,2 At first glance, the reasons why corporations purchase such significant amounts of insurance seem clear. Many people used to believe that corporate purchases of insurance protect stockholders against the risk of loss. However, modern financial theory has argued that investors can hedge against insurable risks through diversification. That is, while the importance of risk aversion in an individual's demand for insurance is obvious, the importance of risk aversion in the corporate demand for insurance is less obvious (Main, 1983; Smith, 1987, 1990; and MacMinn, 1987) . Therefore, it is necessary there are few studies due to lack of data. The few that do exist are Davidson III et al. (1992) , Mayers and Smith (1990) , and Core (1997) . 3 Mayers and Smith (1990) were the first attempt to empirically investigate corporate demand for insurance. Their paper focused on a specific industry, i.e., the insurance industry, because reinsurance premiums paid by insurers are reported in their annual statements. 4 The sample consisted of 1,276 property/casualty insurance companies. Mayers and Smith (1990) found that ownership structure, size, line of business concentration, geographic concentration, and default risk produced significant effects on corporate demand for insurance.
On the other hand, Davidson III et al. (1992) investigated the hypothesis that the purchase of insurance does not affect the cost of equity capital. If there is a systematic relationship between the market and insurable loss, corporations purchase insurance to affect their costs of capital. They estimated insurable risk β values by using the quarterly aggregate underwriting returns. If the insurable risk β values differ significantly from zero, corporate insurance purchases can affect the level of systematic risk of the firm's equity. Based on their findings that the estimated insurable risk β values did not differ significantly from zero, Davidson III et al. (1992) concluded that a reduced cost of equity does not appear to be the motivation behind corporate insurance purchases. However, they did not explicitly estimate the corporate demand function for insurance. Core (1997) attempted to estimate the non-financial corporations' demand for a special kind of insurance by using firm-level data. Specifically, Core investigated determinants of Canadian firms' demand for directors' and officers' insurance. 5 Core found that firms with greater distress probabilities and utilities are more likely to purchase insurance and that firms with greater inside share-ownership are less likely to purchase insurance. Although Core obtained plausible results, keep in mind that he dealt with only a special kind of insurance for Canadian firms.
To obtain robust empirical-stylized facts regarding corporate demand for insurance, the insurance demand functions should be estimated by using various data sets. However, in terms of studies that have been conducted regarding corporate demand for insurance, the theoretical hypotheses have not been substantially tested by actual data. Therefore, knowledge regarding whether previous theoretical predictions are valid is very limited. This limitation is mainly due to the difficulty in obtaining relevant data on United States corporate insurance purchases.
Fortunately, relevant data are available regarding the insurance purchases of Japanese corporations. In this article, the author investigates the corporate insurance purchases by using firm-level data for Japanese non-financial firms. This paper is relevant for the following reasons. First, it is almost the first attempt to investigate the corporate demand for general insurance in terms of the general industrial firms, while previous studies dealt with a specific industry, i.e., the insurance industry's reinsurance demand, or specific insurance, i.e., D&O insurance. Second, as the financial "keiretsu" and mutual share-holdings prevail in the Japanese economy, it is uncommon for investors to hold well-diversified portfolios of securities. Also, because of the lifetime employment system, employees and corporate managers are fully committed to their firm. As the Japanese economic system differs from the M-M ideal markets more than the United States system, Japanese firms are more likely to have higher insurance demand than United States firms. By investigating the insurance demand of Japanese corporations, the author contributes an understanding of the Japanese economic system. This article discusses Japanese corporate insurance purchases that are based on the sample estimation below. The article also specifies factors affecting corporate insurance demand, following previous theoretical studies. The penultimate section of the article presents the empirical results of the study.
SAMPLE
Unfortunately, at present very few Japanese corporations disclose their payments for insurance premiums. However, before current Japanese accounting rules were instituted in 1987, many Japanese corporations disclosed payments for insurance premiums (IP) as part of their sales expenses and general administrative expenses (SGAE). Therefore, the data for 1986 (and 1987 for some companies) are the last available data on corporate insurance purchases, and the author uses them in this paper.
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There were 963 non-financial companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange on May 31, 1987. 7 However, only 504 companies disclosed their insurance premium, and these 504 companies are chosen as the preliminary sample.
Before the estimation, look at summary statistics, shown in Table 1 . Among 504 sample firms, the mean IP is ¥117.0 million and the median is ¥40.8 million. 8 The electricity and gas industry pays the largest insurance premiums. Tokyo Electric Power shows the maximum IP value of ¥4.666 billion. Next, the ratio of IP to SGAE (=IP/SGAE) is discussed. For simplicity, the ratio is denoted as the IPAE. The mean and the median value of the IPAE among the sample are 6.488 × 10 -3 and 3.706 × 10 -3 , respectively. Table 1 shows the distribution of our sample firms and the average IPAE by industry. The industrial group for Nonferrous Metals and Metal Products records the highest average IPAE of 12.172 × 10 -3 . The industrial group for Machinery records the second highest average IPAE. 
FACTORS AFFECTING CORPORATE DEMAND FOR INSURANCE
Previous studies suggested that the following factors affect corporate demand for insurance.
Ownership Structure
As Main (1982a) points out, corporate demand for insurance is indeterminate or irrelevant if stockholders can hold a perfectly diversified portfolio. However, as there is a non-negligible fixed cost for holding well-diverse portfolios, each stockholder holds fewer companies' stocks in the actual market than in the perfect market. If the corporation is held by few stockholders (e.g., owner-manager), the corporation demands more insurance than widely-held corporations.
Mayers and Smith (1990) controlled for differences in ownership structure with dummy variables. They classified firms in 11 ownership categories, such as Lloyd's, mutuals, reciprocal associations, mutual-owned stocks, association-owned stocks, and so on. However, as this sample consists of only stock companies listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, all firms in the sample are classified as "the widely-held stocks" according to the definition of Mayers and Smith (1990) . 9 So, it is very difficult to obtain relevant data about ownership structure regarding these sample firms.
Although the author cannot test the effect of the ownership structure, it is interesting to investigate the special and long-term relationship between industrial corporations and financial institutions (e.g., banks and insurance companies) in the Japanese context (for example, see Prowse, 1992) . This relationship, called a financial "keiretsu," or group, is accused of unfair commercial customs in Japanese financial markets because the tie between non-financial firms and financial institutions is so tight that newcomers (e.g., foreign companies) cannot obtain customers. Stocks of firms belonging to a financial keiretsu are mainly held by member firms of the same financial keiretsu. For example, in 1990, 51.01 percent of the outstanding shares of Mitsubishi Motor, one of the biggest automobile makers in Japan, were held by member corporations of Mitsubishi financial keiretsu.
The author tries to use the accumulated shares of the top ten stockholders (TOPTEN) as ownership concentration, although TOPTEN is not directly related to the ownership structure as that notion is used in the U.S. literature. In the U.S. literature, the ownership structure refers to differences in the legal structure of the organization (e.g., mutual company or stock company). Here, keep in mind that most of the top ten stockholders of the sample firms are large corporations.
10 TOPTEN might proxy for agency costs; if other corporations own the firm, then they may monitor the activity of the firm and the conflict of interest problems that lead to ownership problems would be resolved. A significant coefficient of TOPTEN, showing that the mutual share holdings in the Japanese financial keiretsu affects insurance demand, will indicate further research in the Japanese context is required. 9 Its criterion for "widely-held" is that there are more than 100 shareholders. According to the Tokyo Stock Exchange (1996) , one of the numerical criteria for delisting is that the number of shareholders is less than 400 for firms issuing less than 10 million shares. 10 Therefore, even if the TOPTEN has a significantly positive coefficient, it cannot simply be attributed to risk-averse behavior of individual stockholders.
Also, as the author wants to investigate whether Japanese insurance companies wield their influence as large stockholders when they sell insurance to the firms, the number of non-life insurance companies among the top ten stockholders, SONPO, is included in the regression. As is well-known, the core members of the financial keiretsu are insurance companies as well as banks. If the coefficient of SONPO is significantly positive, it could be interpreted that insurance companies exploit their position as large stockholders to maximize sales of insurance to the firms.
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Tax Consideration
Main (1983a; b) points out that one strong motivation for purchasing insurance lies in the tax laws as they affect insured losses. This motivation stems from the fact that payment of the insurance premium is deductible from taxable profits.
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The Japanese corporate tax rate is the same irrespective of the amount of profits, and interest on bonds, losses, and so forth are deductible; these items reduce the corporate income that is taxable at a fixed tax rate. In fiscal year 1987, the tax rate was 42 percent. However, because firms with no profits do not have to pay corporate tax and because losses are deductible from taxable income, the above argument for the effect of taxes on insurance demand may be relevant particularly for firms with profits that are lower than potential insurable losses.
Here, the current amount of tax payments (TAX) is a proxy for tax consideration. If the TAX has a positive coefficient, then it is consistent with the theoretical argument by Mayers and Smith (1986) , which suggested that highly profitable corporations can reduce real tax burdens by using insurance premiums. However, there is an important limitation. The tax argument is valid in Japan, where the corporate tax is a flat tax rate, only when a firm's pretax income will likely fall in the convex portion of the tax curve because of negative profits. In other words, as Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) pointed out, the tax consideration is not an important factor for those firms whose pretax income does not fall in the convex portion of the tax curve.
Leverage
As creditors to highly-leveraged corporations may face potential bankruptcy costs due to unexpected disasters, they may insist that the borrowing corporations reduce the possibility of bankruptcy by purchasing insurance. For example, Davidson et al. (1992) argued that the primary motivation for corporate insurance purchases can be explained by the bondholder's "me-first" rule. The bondholders require the firm to purchase insurance because their expected value never decreases and often increases when insurance is purchased. Satisfying their demand, the stockholders can enjoy a lower cost of debt.
11 As pointed out by MacMinn, SONPO may be a proxy for something other than what is stated here. For example, SONPO may also proxy for a monitor and reduce agency costs, which would imply a reduced need for insurance to control the problem. The insurance company doing the monitoring might also not want to cover the loss because it would mean losing the value of limited liability. 12 Main (1983b) proved that insurance increases the expected tax shield in the case of a loss, and that this increase in the tax shield will outweigh the capital gains tax as long as the capital gains tax rate is less than the corporate profit tax rate.
Here, there are two proxies. The first one is the capital ratio (CAPITAL) (i.e., the ratio of shareholders' equity to total assets). 13 The second is the ratio (INPR) of financial expenses (i.e., interest payments and discount fees) to operating profits. The lower the CAPITAL and the higher the INPR, the higher is the probability of bankruptcy. Therefore, a negative coefficient of the CAPITAL and a positive coefficient of the INPR can be expected.
Size
Previous studies point out two possible causes of the size effect on corporate demand for insurance. One is related to bankruptcy costs and the other to the agency costs. For example, Mayers and Smith (1990) insisted that, as direct bankruptcy costs are less than proportional to firm size, small corporations suffer much more relative to larger firms in the case of bankruptcy. Therefore, small corporations are more likely to purchase insurance. Also, the author expects that the smaller the corporation, the more difficult it is to diversify risk. The market capitalization (VALUE) and the sales and general administrative expenses (SGAE) are used as scale variables. 14 The VALUE is calculated based on the stock price at the last trading day in March 1987, which was the end of the fiscal year for most Japanese corporations. If the bankruptcy costs are important for insurance demand, the coefficients of the scale variables (in the natural logarithm) are expected to be less than unity.
However, the agency costs will act in the opposite direction. A large firm tends to have such a complex structure that shareholders and bondholders cannot sufficiently monitor the management of the firm. By requiring the firm to purchase insurance, they expect that insurers undertake a thorough examination. For example, O'Sullivan (1997) found that large United Kingdom firms are more likely to purchase directors' and officers' insurance in order to monitor managers than small firms. Therefore, if the agency costs are relevant, then the coefficients of the scale variables are expected to be more than unity. and Smith (1982) suggested that regulated industries demand more insurance than unregulated industries because of the mark-up pricing used by regulators in regulated industries. Also, the literature regarding expense-preference hypothesis (e.g., Edwards 1977) suggested that managers of firms in less competitive markets may likely indulge in high expenditures. As regulators usually restrict competition, managers of firms in the regulated industries are more likely to behave in an expense-preference manner.
Regulated Industries

Mayers
In Japan, the electric power and gas industry is the typical regulated industry, whose prices are set by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI). The author uses a dummy variable, DUDEN, which is 1 if a firm is classified into the electric power and gas industry and zero if classified otherwise. The above argument expects a positive coefficient of the DUDEN.
RESULTS
In the estimation of Japanese corporate insurance purchases, the author uses the accumulated shares of the top ten stockholders (TOPTEN), the tax payment (TAX), the capital ratio (CAPITAL), the sales and administrative expenses (SGAE), and the market capitalization (VALUE) to calculate the natural logarithm of insurance payments (IP). As some variables discussed in the above section are not available, the sample used for the estimation varies.
In sum, the basic equation in the estimation is as follows:
Log(IP) = c 0 + c 1 TOPTEN + c 2 Log(TAX) + c 3 CAPITAL + c 4 Log(SGAE) + c 5 Log(VALUE).
The estimated basic equation for the whole sample is shown as equation (1) in Table  2 . The coefficient (0.758) for the Log(SGAE) is positive and significant at the 1 percent critical level. The coefficient of the Log(VALUE) is also positive and significant at the 5 percent level. When either Log(SGAE) or Log(VALUE) is used as a scale variable, its coefficients are 0.823 (shown as equation (2) in Table 2 ) and 0.566 (equation (3)), both of which are significantly less than unity. This is consistent with the bankruptcy costs hypothesis, which predicted that larger firms demand comparatively less insurance, and is not consistent with the agency costs arguments. In Japan, where main banks play dominant roles in monitoring managers, insurers are naturally not expected to monitor managers on behalf of stockholders.
The coefficient of the Log(TAX) is insignificantly negative except in equation (3). It shows that tax consideration is not an important factor in determining insurance demand. As Mayer and Smith (1990) remarked, the convexity of the tax function stimulates insurance demand because the firms have expected tax liabilities greater than the tax liabilities associated with their expected pretax income. However, the Japanese corporate income tax system is not convex but linear. Furthermore, Japanese firms are said to be able to manipulate taxable profits by using the hidden reserves because of Japanese accounting procedures. This is one of the reasons why the tax consideration is not relevant regarding Japanese corporate insurance demand. The second reason is provided by Mayer and Smith (1982) , who argued that large firms with spatially dispersed operations would be less likely to expect casualty losses that are large relative to their taxable earnings. In fact, as all firms in the sample satisfied the listing standard of the Tokyo Stock Exchanges, they were all large firms in this respect. Third, all firms in the sample recorded positive profits in the sample period. As Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) pointed out, the tax consideration is not an important factor for those firms whose pretax income does not fall in the convex portion of the tax curve. Therefore, the author's result is consistent with Colquitt and Hoyt (1997) .
However, based on a mathematical model, MacMinn (1997) recently demonstrated the theorem, "The corporate tax suffices to generate a demand for insurance." In essence, the theorem says that the corporate tax motivates the demand for insurance because levering up to purchase insurance allows the firm to replace a risky tax shelter with a safe tax shelter. According to the theorem, what is important in ruling out the importance of taxes is that interest expenses on debt are not tax-deductible. Therefore, as interest expenses on debt are tax-deductible in Japanese corporate tax system, the insignificant coefficient of LOG(TAX) may be a puzzle. (1) equation (2) equation (3) equation (4 (5) equation (6) equation (7 The coefficient of the CAPITAL is expectably negative but insignificant at the 10 percent critical level. The negative sign is consistent with previous theoretical predictions. That is, firms with higher bankruptcy probability demand more insurance than those with lower probability. Next, the author estimates the basic equation with INPR instead of CAPITAL. The result is shown in equation (4). Previous studies suggest that lenders to firms with higher INPR face higher probability of the firms being in financial distress or defaulting and actively insist that highly-leveraged firms purchase an insurance policy. The coefficient of the INPR is expectably positive but insignificant at the 10 percent critical level. Therefore, the author can only provide very weak support of the argument.
According to the insignificant coefficients for the TOPTEN and SONPO, ownership structure does not play an important role in determining corporate demand for insurance regarding at least large Japanese firms. However, mutual share holdings between corporations are very common in Japan, and corporate shareholders differ from personal shareholders in terms of investment motivation (see previous studies about the financial keiretsu, such as Prowse, 1992) . 15 Therefore, the TOPTEN may not be a good proxy for ownership structure. The coefficient of the SONPO is unexpectedly negative, as shown in equation (6). So, the SONPO is replaced with a new variable (SONPO2), which is 1 if at least one non-life insurance company is among the largest ten shareholders and zero if otherwise. However, the coefficient of the SONPO2 is still negative and insignificant. 16 In conclusion, the ownership structure measured in the proxies is not an important factor in determining corporate demand for insurance.
The dummy for the electricity and gas industry (DUNDEN) is positive and significant at the 10 percent critical level. This is consistent with Mayers and Smith (1982) , who insisted that regulated industries demand more insurance, and with Core (1997) , who, in fact, found that utilities are more likely to purchase insurance.
CONCLUSION
Since Mayers and Smith (1982) first argued that the corporate insurance purchase is irrelevant because insurable risks can be eliminated by shareholders holding diversified portfolios, there have been numerous theoretical papers that investigated factors affecting corporate demand for insurance, such as transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, and agency costs. Several factors theoretically affect corporate demand for insurance. However, mainly due to data unavailability, empirical tests of the theories are limited. The author was able to investigate this issue because more than 500 Japanese corporations disclosed their insurance payments before the disclosure rule was changed in 1987. Analysis of insurance purchase data from many Japanese firms provides a unique opportunity for evaluating determinants of corporate insurance demand. This article is one of the first attempts to empirically investigate the demand for general insurance of non-financial corporations. 15 According to the survey on share ownership by The National Conference of Stock Exchanges of Japan, 23.9 percent of listed shares were held by business corporations and 40.8 percent by financial institutions excluding investment trusts at the end of fiscal year 1993. 16 See Note 11.
The results support several predictions of previous studies and call for further research. First, insurance demand elasticity in terms of a firm's size is less than unity. Therefore, small corporations are likely to purchase relatively more insurance than large corporations. This is consistent with the fact that stockholders do not depend on the monitoring role of insurers in Japan, where "main banks" play a dominant role in monitoring firms. Second, the evidence that firms with a higher probability of bankruptcy demand more insurance is weak. However, this result may be biased because most firms in the sample perform so well that stakeholders do not have to consider bankruptcy risks. Third, if the other conditions are the same, the electricity and gas industry demands more insurance. This is consistent with conjecture developed by Mayers and Smith (1982) , which argued that regulated industries demand more insurance than non-regulated industries. However, it is uncertain whether this is due to the bureaucratic price setting rule or due to expense-preference behavior in less competitive markets. Fourth, the author cannot offer evidence that corporate ownership structure is an important factor in determining insurance demand. However, this result is tentative, because (1) all firms in the sample are listed, or widely-held companies, and (2) the proxies used in this article do not appropriately reflect ownership structure. Furthermore, the results are based only on stock companies and therefore suggest nothing about the effect of other ownership structures, such as mutuals and partnerships. Fifth, the author fails to demonstrate that tax consideration plays an important role in determining insurance demand. As tax consideration is not an important factor for those firms whose pretax income does not fall in the convex portion of the tax curve, this result may be due to the sample bias since all firms in this sample recorded positive profits.
